PhantomCore espionage group targets Russian companies with fake fire-suppression specification lures

Russian threat-intelligence firm F6 has reported a new phishing campaign by the cyber-espionage group PhantomCore, which Kaspersky also tracks under the Head Mare name. The emails went out on 19 and 21 January 2026 to Russian organisations in many sectors, posing as a request to approve a technical specification for a fire-suppression system. Russian outlets Anti-Malware.ru and Habr covered the findings.

What happened

The messages came from legitimate corporate email addresses, which most likely belonged to accounts compromised earlier. That lent the lure credibility and helped it pass sender-reputation checks. Targeted sectors included housing and utilities, finance, municipal and urban infrastructure services, aerospace, chemicals, construction, consumer goods manufacturing, consumer digital services, e-commerce and marketplaces.

Technical details

  • The attachment was a ZIP archive named after the specification (“ТЗ на согласование сб 54 от 19.01.26”). It contained a file with a .doc extension and a shortcut with a double extension, .docx.lnk.
  • The .doc file was actually a RAR archive holding a genuine decoy document.
  • Opening the .lnk shortcut ran a cmd command that downloaded and executed a PowerShell script.
  • The script displayed the decoy and loaded an in-memory PowerShell backdoor that F6 links to the PhantomRemote / PhantomCore.PollDL family, fetched from a compromised host.
  • Persistence came from a scheduled task in Windows Task Scheduler.
  • Researchers found about ten Russian-hosted resources serving second-stage scripts.

Separately, Positive Technologies said its PT X product detected a PhantomCore intrusion in January in which the group had been inside a company’s network for two weeks. It entered through a vulnerable video-conferencing platform and compromised a domain controller and Active Directory Certificate Services.

Who is affected

Primarily Russian commercial and public-sector organisations. The techniques are generic, though: LNK droppers inside archives, mail sent from compromised partner accounts, and fileless PowerShell backdoors. Defenders everywhere should watch for them.

Recommendations

  • Block or quarantine archives containing .lnk files and double-extension attachments at the mail gateway.
  • Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging and AMSI, and alert on cmd.exe or explorer.exe spawning PowerShell with download cradles.
  • Hunt for new scheduled tasks created by user-context processes shortly after an archive was opened.
  • Treat unexpected documents from known partners as suspicious and confirm by phone, because the sender’s mailbox may be compromised.
  • Patch and segment video-conferencing servers, and limit the reach of administrative accounts across network segments.

Sources