Germany names Russian national Oleg Nefedov as Black Basta ransomware leader in public manhunt

Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Frankfurt am Main public prosecutor’s office have launched a public manhunt for Oleg Evgenievich Nefedov, a Russian national they accuse of founding and running the Black Basta ransomware operation. He has been added to the EU Most Wanted list and is the subject of an INTERPOL Red Notice. Investigators believe he is in Russia.

What happened

According to the BKA appeal published on 15 January 2026, Nefedov is suspected of founding a criminal organisation abroad, aggravated extortion and related offences between January 2022 and February 2025. Investigators say he led the group, chose targets, recruited members, took part in ransom negotiations and managed the proceeds. The aliases attributed to him include tramp, gg, AA, kurva, Washingt0n and S.Jimmi.

German-language reporting adds that police in Ukraine, working with the BKA, searched the homes of two Ukrainian nationals from Ivano-Frankivsk and Lviv. The two are suspected of cracking password hashes to support Black Basta’s intrusions. Authorities in the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom also took part in the investigation.

Impact

German authorities attribute attacks on more than 100 companies in Germany and around 600 more worldwide to the group, with damage in Germany alone estimated at over €20 million. Researchers previously estimated Black Basta had collected more than $100 million in ransoms by the end of 2023. The group went quiet after its internal chat logs leaked in February 2025. Those logs exposed internal disputes and many of the identifiers now used by investigators.

Naming him publicly makes it much harder for Nefedov to travel and further damages trust within the Russian-speaking ransomware ecosystem, although an arrest is unlikely while he stays in Russia.

Recommendations

  • Former Black Basta affiliates have moved to other ransomware brands, so keep detections for their known tradecraft. That includes initial access through phishing and email bombing followed by fake IT-support calls, abuse of remote management tools, and Cobalt Strike-style post-exploitation.
  • Black Basta victims should share their incident data with national police (the BKA in Germany). Leaked chats and seized evidence can help with attribution and recovery.
  • Strengthen password hashing and credential hygiene. The case shows that affiliates specialise in cracking stolen hashes.
  • Restrict outbound connections from servers and monitor for mass encryption precursors such as shadow copy deletion and backup tampering.

Sources