US medical technology company Stryker suffered a global disruption of its Microsoft environment on 11 March 2026 after attackers remotely wiped devices enrolled in its mobile device management platform. The Iran-linked group Handala, which presents itself as a pro-Palestinian hacktivist persona and has been associated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security, claimed responsibility.
What happened
Employees told BleepingComputer that managed Windows laptops and mobile phones – including personal phones enrolled for work access – were factory reset early on 11 March. Staff were told to remove Intune Company Portal, Teams and VPN clients from personal devices, and some sites reverted to paper processes. TechCrunch reported that the attackers had compromised an internal administrator account and used Intune dashboards to issue the wipe commands.
Handala claimed it had wiped more than 200,000 systems, stolen 50 TB of data and defaced Stryker’s Entra login page; these claims were not confirmed by the company. In an SEC Form 8-K, Stryker said it identified the incident on 11 March, had no indication of ransomware or malware, believed the incident was contained, and could not yet give a restoration timeline.
Follow-up
On 19 March the FBI and Justice Department seized Handala websites used to publish its claimed hacks and to dox people allegedly tied to the Israeli military and defence contractors. Handala acknowledged the takedowns on Telegram and vowed to continue. In a further 8-K on 23 March, Stryker said a malicious file had been used to conceal the actor’s activity but was not capable of spreading, cited an assurance letter from Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 supporting its view that the incident was contained, and said the operational and financial impact was still being assessed.
Impact
The incident shows how legitimate administrative tooling can be turned into a destructive weapon without deploying malware: a single privileged identity with wipe rights across the fleet was enough to halt ordering, manufacturing and shipping at a Fortune 500 company with more than 50,000 employees.
Recommendations
- Require phishing-resistant MFA and privileged access workstations for all Intune and Entra administrators.
- Enable Intune multi-admin approval for high-impact actions such as device wipe and retire.
- Alert on bulk wipe, retire or reset actions and on new role assignments in Intune and Entra ID.
- Separate personal BYOD enrolment from full device management so that a corporate wipe cannot erase personal devices.
- Keep offline recovery procedures for critical manufacturing and logistics workflows.