A new wave of the Shai-Hulud npm worm, which its operators call “Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming”, spread through the JavaScript ecosystem on 24 November 2025. It trojanised packages maintained by Zapier, ENS Domains, PostHog, Postman, AsyncAPI and many others. The first Shai-Hulud wave in September compromised 187 packages. This one is far larger.
What happened
Malicious versions were published from about 21 to 24 November. Counts differ by vendor and methodology. Datadog identified at least 796 unique packages (1,092 versions) with more than 20 million combined weekly downloads, and Zscaler reported over 700 packages within hours of discovery. Wiz said more than 25,000 GitHub repositories containing stolen secrets had been created, with around 1,000 more appearing every 30 minutes on the first day.
Post-mortems from affected vendors show how the worm spread. At PostHog, a bot’s GitHub personal access token was stolen and used to harvest CI secrets, including the npm publishing token. Postman traced its exposure to an automated build without a proper lockfile, which pulled in compromised AsyncAPI packages inside GitHub Actions.
Technical details
- The payload runs from a preinstall script, so it executes on developer machines and CI runners as soon as the package is installed.
- It collects npm tokens, GitHub credentials and cloud secrets, then publishes them to attacker-created public GitHub repositories.
- Using stolen npm credentials, it automatically backdoors up to 100 packages owned by the victim, which is what makes it self-replicating.
Who is affected
Any developer workstation or CI/CD pipeline that installed an affected version during the window should be treated as compromised. That includes indirect installs through transitive dependencies. Organisations that do not pin dependencies with lockfiles are especially exposed.
Recommendations
- Search lockfiles and build logs for affected package versions published on or after 21 November 2025. Roll back to earlier versions and clear the npm cache.
- Rotate all npm, GitHub, and cloud credentials that were present on affected hosts or in CI secrets, and revoke old personal access tokens.
- Search GitHub for unexpected repositories created under your organisation’s or developers’ accounts.
- Enforce
npm ciwith committed lockfiles, consider--ignore-scriptsin CI, and require trusted publishing or 2FA for package releases. - Leaked developer and CI credentials frequently resurface in criminal collections. Checking affected identities against TAYNOPIS can help confirm whether exposed accounts are circulating.