French security outlet ZATAZ and Huntress researchers report a fast-moving campaign against managed service providers using ConnectWise ScreenConnect. On 11 November 2026, an attacker used cloud-hosted ScreenConnect consoles to push attacker-controlled ScreenConnect clients and a toolkit dubbed SCKit to at least 288 computers belonging to 48 organisations. About a third of those hosts were reached in the first ten minutes and all within roughly 90 minutes.
What happened
The commands were issued through ScreenConnect’s Run Command capability, which executes with SYSTEM privileges, yet Huntress found no matching user logins. Logs instead tied the activity to RMM+, an independent third-party extension used to manage ScreenConnect sessions. RMM+ authenticates with a shared access key rather than ScreenConnect’s own accounts, roles and MFA. In versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32, the key could be empty by default and the authentication check would accept a blank value.
Huntress described SCKit as a 16-file toolkit that replaces or hijacks the legitimate ScreenConnect guest client while reusing its genuine libraries to blend in, and includes functions to harvest authenticated session cookies with the aim of pivoting through technicians’ sessions. ZATAZ notes that logged cookie-reuse attempts failed. A further wave on 13 November touched 205 hosts across 41 organisations, according to Huntress telemetry.
Vendor response
ConnectWise found around 400 partner environments with at least one extension from the RMM+ family and disabled five of them: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link. It says it has seen no breach of its own infrastructure and no ScreenConnect vulnerability, and that having the extension installed does not mean an environment was compromised. The initial access vector remains under investigation.
Recommendations
- Inventory ScreenConnect extensions and remove any RMM+ family components; if needed, ensure an explicit strong access key is configured.
- Review Run Command history and audit logs since 11 November for unexpected mass commands.
- Hunt endpoints for additional ScreenConnect client instances or services not deployed by your team.
- Invalidate technician sessions, rotate ScreenConnect credentials and enforce MFA on all console accounts.