OpenAI confirms two employee devices hit by TanStack npm worm, rotates code-signing certificates

OpenAI disclosed on May 14 that two employees’ devices were compromised in the TanStack npm supply-chain attack, part of a fast-spreading campaign researchers call Mini Shai-Hulud and attribute to the TeamPCP extortion group. OpenAI says customer data, production systems, intellectual property and deployed software were not affected. Because code-signing certificates were exposed, it is rotating them for all platforms.

What happened

On May 11, attackers published 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages within a few minutes. The flaw chain is tracked as CVE-2026-45321 (CVSS 9.6). The attacker opened a pull request from a fork. That triggered a pull_request_target workflow, which ran attacker code in a trusted context and poisoned the GitHub Actions cache. A later legitimate release restored the poisoned cache. The malicious code then pulled OIDC tokens from runner memory and swapped them for npm publish rights, so the trojanized releases carried valid provenance attestations.

The worm moved on to packages from Mistral AI, UiPath, Guardrails AI, OpenSearch and others. Tenable counts more than 170 affected npm and PyPI packages.

Payload

  • Steals GitHub and npm tokens, AWS credentials, Kubernetes secrets, SSH keys, Vault tokens and .env files.
  • Stays on the system by adding a gh-token-monitor service and by injecting entries into .vscode/tasks.json and Claude Code settings hooks. Tenable reports that it can wipe files if the stolen token is revoked.
  • Spreads by publishing trojanized versions of every package the stolen credentials can reach.

OpenAI’s response

OpenAI isolated the affected systems, revoked sessions, rotated credentials, temporarily restricted deployment workflows and brought in an outside incident response firm. Certificates for macOS, Windows, iOS and Android were exposed. OpenAI has seen no misuse but is replacing them. macOS users must update OpenAI desktop apps before June 12, 2026.

Recommendations

  • Check lockfiles and CI logs for affected versions in the @tanstack, @mistralai, @uipath and @opensearch-project namespaces.
  • Remove persistence before revoking tokens. Delete gh-token-monitor and the injected VS Code and agent hooks first, then rotate all developer and CI secrets.
  • Replace pull_request_target with pull_request where possible, pin Actions to commit SHAs and keep fork caches separate.
  • Install packages with --ignore-scripts and use a minimum release age for new versions.

Sources