Mandiant details Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN zero-day CVE-2026-20245 used to plant rogue root accounts

Cisco has patched CVE-2026-20245, a high-severity command injection flaw in Catalyst SD-WAN Manager (vManage), Controller (vSmart) and Validator (vBond). Mandiant has also published how it was exploited as a zero-day against a service provider. Cisco says exploitation has been limited and that no workarounds exist.

Attack chain

Mandiant found two bursts of unauthorised activity in the provider’s SD-WAN fabric, starting in late 2025. From March 2026 the attacker set up new rogue peering connections. Mandiant suspects earlier authentication bypass zero-days (CVE-2026-20127, CVE-2026-20182) or stolen certificates enabled this. Cisco says CVE-2026-20182 was not involved and points to reused certificate material.

  1. The attacker authenticated over SSH as vmanage-admin, changed the default admin password, logged into the web UI and exported configuration for edge devices, controllers and templates. Then they restored the original password.
  2. In April, they exploited CVE-2026-20245 by uploading a crafted file, evil_tenant.csv, through the CLI tenant-upload function. This ran commands as root.
  3. The payload backed up /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, created a root-level account named troot and switched to it.
  4. The attacker then cleaned up. They restored the changed files, deleted the CSV and temporary files, removed traces of the rogue account and ran a script to confirm nothing was left.

Impact

SD-WAN controllers hold the configuration and trust anchors for whole WAN fabrics. Root on these systems lets an attacker change routing, intercept traffic or establish persistence that survives edge-device rebuilds. This bug adds to a run of exploited Cisco SD-WAN vulnerabilities this year.

Recommendations

  • Upgrade every SD-WAN Manager, Controller and Validator to the fixed releases in Cisco advisory cisco-sa-sdwan-privesc-4uxFrdzx. Cisco states there is no workaround.
  • Review peering tables for unknown or unexpected peers and check controller certificates. Rotate certificate material if compromise is possible.
  • Hunt for evil_tenant.csv, an account named troot, unexplained vmanage-admin SSH sessions and admin password changes that were later reverted.
  • Collect diagnostic bundles from SD-WAN devices before upgrading so forensic evidence is preserved, and compare /etc/passwd against a known-good baseline.

Sources