GitHub has confirmed that attackers stole about 3,800 of its internal repositories after one employee installed a malicious version of a popular Visual Studio Code extension. The breach shows how the Mini Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign moved from npm packages into developer tools and on to a major platform provider.
What happened
On May 18, a compromised build of the Nx Console extension (nrwl.angular-console 18.95.0) was available on the VS Code Marketplace for about 18 minutes. Reporting traces the compromise to an Nx developer whose system was infected in the earlier TanStack npm attack. When the extension loaded, it fetched and ran an obfuscated payload hidden in an orphan commit in the official nrwl/nx repository. Nx’s CEO said real installs may have exceeded 6,000, far more than first estimated.
On May 19, the TeamPCP group advertised what it called about 4,000 private GitHub repositories on a cybercrime forum. It asked at least $50,000 and threatened to leak the data for free if no buyer appeared. GitHub said its investigation was “directionally consistent” with the claimed number and confirmed the extension as the entry point.
Impact
- GitHub says only GitHub-internal repositories were exfiltrated, and it has no evidence that customer data stored elsewhere was affected. It acknowledged that some internal repositories contain excerpts of customer support interactions.
- GitHub removed the malicious extension version, isolated the employee’s machine and started incident response.
- The Nx Console compromise is tracked as
CVE-2026-48027(CVSS 9.3).
Why it matters
IDE extensions run with the developer’s full privileges and usually update automatically. A malicious build that is public for only minutes can still reach thousands of machines, including those of engineers with access to sensitive code.
Recommendations
- Check developer machines for Nx Console 18.95.0 and treat any host that ran it as compromised. Rotate GitHub, npm, cloud and SSH credentials from a clean device.
- Allowlist approved VS Code extensions and turn off automatic extension updates on privileged engineering workstations.
- Use short-lived, SSO-bound GitHub tokens, and watch audit logs for bulk clone activity.
- Assume source code may leak. Make sure repositories hold no secrets or customer data that would raise the impact.