The GhostAction supply-chain campaign has returned at much larger scale. GitGuardian researchers report that between 8 and 12 October 2026 the operators pushed malicious GitHub Actions workflows to more than 30,000 repositories belonging to around 3,000 users and organisations, after compromising roughly 1,900 developer accounts. The workflows attempted to extract 3,174 secrets from the CI pipelines of public repositories.
What happened
GhostAction does not rely on a GitHub vulnerability. The attackers obtain write access using stolen personal access tokens or credentials harvested from infostealer logs, then commit a workflow with an innocuous name such as security-audit.yml or github_actions_security.yml. When the workflow runs, it sends repository secrets to attacker infrastructure.
On 8 and 9 October the payload was first sent to 160 previously compromised victims and, about 20 minutes later, to 28,000 new repositories. GitHub began blocking the malicious workflow on 9 October, so follow-up waves on 10 and 12 October could not extract secrets. GitGuardian confirmed that some exfiltration succeeded before then but could not quantify it. Part of the victim set had also been hit in the September 2025 and August 2026 waves, showing the attackers count on secrets that are never rotated.
Technical details
New payload versions add git-history scanning with regular expressions for AWS access key IDs, GitHub and GitLab tokens, AI provider keys and other cloud credentials, and later variants capture surrounding lines to pair key IDs with their secret keys. Targets include package registry tokens for npm, PyPI and Docker Hub, which creates downstream risk of poisoned releases.
Recommendations
- Search all repositories for unexpected workflow files added since 31 August 2026 and review recent commits by maintainers.
- Rotate every secret exposed to Actions in affected repositories, including registry and cloud tokens, then review registry publish history.
- Replace long-lived PATs with fine-grained, short-lived tokens; require approval for workflow runs from new contributors.
- Enforce phishing-resistant MFA for maintainers. Because many hijacks start with infostealer logs, consider checking developer credentials against leak sources such as TAYNOPIS and treat any hit as a mandatory reset.