European Commission confirms breach of Europa.eu cloud hosting, its second cyberattack of 2026

The European Commission confirmed in late March 2026 that attackers had breached the cloud infrastructure hosting its web presence on the Europa.eu platform. Spanish trade outlet MuyComputerPRO noted that it was the institution’s second confirmed cyberattack of the year, following the mobile device management intrusion disclosed in February.

What happened

The Commission detected the attack on 24 March, after its Cybersecurity Operations Centre raised initial alerts the previous day, and disclosed it publicly on 27 March. It said internal Commission systems were not affected, no websites were disrupted or altered, and the incident was contained. BleepingComputer reported that the intruders accessed systems through one of the Commission’s AWS accounts and obtained about 350 GB of data, including several databases. The ShinyHunters extortion group claimed responsibility and published data on its leak site.

Technical details

CERT-EU later assessed with high confidence that initial access came from the Trivy supply-chain compromise: an AWS secret was harvested on 19 March when a compromised Trivy version was run through normal update channels. The attacker used TruffleHog to find and validate further credentials, then created a new access key on an existing IAM user to blend in before conducting reconnaissance and exfiltration.

Impact

According to CERT-EU, as reported by Security Affairs, tens of thousands of files were taken relating to websites operated for up to 71 Europa hosting clients – 42 Commission services and at least 29 other EU bodies. Exposed data includes names, usernames and e-mail addresses, plus more than 51,000 outbound e-mail files, mostly automated messages, some of which may contain user-submitted content. Analysis of the affected databases is expected to take considerable time, and the Commission is notifying affected EU entities.

Recommendations

  • Treat any cloud credentials present in CI/CD pipelines that ran compromised Trivy builds as exposed and rotate them.
  • Alert on creation of new access keys on existing IAM users and on use of secret-scanning tools from unfamiliar sources.
  • Replace long-lived IAM user keys in pipelines with short-lived, OIDC-federated roles scoped to the minimum required.
  • Enable CloudTrail data events for S3 and database services hosting public web content to support scoping after an incident.

Sources