Owners of older Coldcard hardware wallets have lost large amounts of bitcoin after attackers exploited a long-standing weakness in how the devices generated seed phrases. Coinkite, Coldcard’s maker, disclosed the problem on 30 July 2026, the same evening a coordinated sweep emptied hundreds of wallets. It shipped emergency firmware the next day.
What happened
A firmware change shipped in March 2021 (v4.0.0) caused seed generation on Coldcard Mk2 and Mk3 devices to use MicroPython’s deterministic Yasmarang pseudo-random generator instead of the chip’s hardware RNG. A helper library checked only whether a configuration setting existed, not what its value was. The generator’s state depended largely on the microcontroller ID and low-entropy timing values. That made it possible to brute-force candidate seeds offline and match them against addresses visible on the public blockchain, with no physical access to the device and no malware on the victim’s computer.
The first wave on 30 July ran for about 25 minutes and took roughly 594 BTC (about USD 38 million) from around 500 single-signature wallets. Several more waves followed in early August. Galaxy Research later estimated that about 1,816 BTC (roughly USD 114 million) had been taken from more than 5,200 addresses. Block’s bitcoin engineering team independently identified the root cause.
Who is affected
- Mk2 and Mk3 devices that generated seeds on firmware v4.0.0 through v5.0.3 are in the confirmed vulnerable window.
- Seeds created on those devices remain weak wherever they are now used, including seeds imported into other wallets.
- Coinkite and Block say the Mk4, Q and Mk5 are not affected by this attack, although Block flagged their earlier reseeding design as a weakness. Galaxy found no multisig wallets among the drained addresses.
Recommendations
- Updating firmware does not repair an existing seed. Anyone who generated a seed on an affected device should create a new seed on an unaffected device and move funds.
- Verify the new backup and a receive address on the device screen, send a small test transaction first, then transfer the balance.
- Never restore the old seed into a new wallet. Coinkite says a strong BIP-39 passphrase that was never typed on a computer greatly reduces risk, but migrating is still advised.
- Wallet and firmware developers should verify RNG configuration values, not just their presence, and add runtime self-tests for entropy sources.