China-nexus UNC6508 backdoored REDCap servers to spy on North American medical research for two years

Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has exposed a long-running espionage campaign against North American academic, medical and military research institutions. GTIG attributes it with high confidence to UNC6508, a threat actor linked to the People’s Republic of China. The group compromised servers running REDCap, a research data-capture platform widely used in clinical studies. At one university it stayed inside the network from September 2023 to November 2025.

Technical details

  • Initial access: GTIG could not confirm the exact method. UNC6508 probed for legacy REDCap versions left installed next to current ones, a form of downgrade attack. It then planted a web shell, help.php, and gathered database and service account credentials.
  • INFINITERED: about three months after first access, the group deployed a custom modular backdoor that trojanizes real REDCap files. It has three parts. One captures usernames and passwords from login requests and stores them encrypted in the redcap_sessions table under the prefix xc32038474a. One runs commands received in cookies: shell execution, file upload and download, and SQL queries. One hijacks the REDCap upgrade routine so every new version is re-infected, which means upgrading alone does not remove it.
  • Pivot to email: more than a year later, the actor reused harvested credentials to log in as a Google Workspace administrator. It created a content compliance rule named “Patroit” that matched keywords about military strategy, advanced technology and medical research, and silently copied matching mail to an attacker-controlled Gmail account. GTIG calls this a new technique for PRC-nexus actors.

Targeting

Collection priorities included defence intelligence, Indo-Pacific command operations, artificial intelligence, uncrewed systems, offensive cyber programmes and medical research. GTIG disrupted the infrastructure and notified affected organisations in the US and Canada.

Recommendations

  • Upgrade REDCap to the latest release and remove all legacy versions from servers.
  • Scan REDCap hosts with GTIG’s G_Backdoor_INFINITERED_1 YARA rule. Search for the GUID b49e334d-9c01-463e-9bc5-00a6920fb66e and the session prefix above.
  • Audit Google Workspace content compliance and routing rules for hidden BCC forwarding, and send admin audit logs to your SIEM.
  • Require phishing-resistant MFA for administrators, and use unique credentials across application and identity domains to prevent credential replay.
  • Hunt for the published IOCs, including admin logins from 23.169.65.49.

Sources