Brazil’s state-owned bank Caixa Econômica Federal restricted services across its network of lottery outlets (lotéricas) after a cyber incident on 21 July 2026 triggered waves of unauthorised transactions in several states. Brazilian media and industry associations described the event as a coordinated attack. Caixa confirmed an incident but has not disclosed its cause.
What happened
From around 15:00 local time on Tuesday, 21 July, operators in São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul reported terminals processing bill (boleto) payments they had not authorised. The payments ran in quick succession, seconds or minutes apart, typically for R$4,500–5,000 each. Some outlets recorded hundreds of thousands of reais in irregular payments; one São Paulo outlet alone logged more than R$300,000. Local reports from Piauí put losses at two outlets there at about R$1 million.
Caixa’s automated monitoring flagged an atypical volume of transactions, and the bank set up a crisis room. It then blocked bill payments across the whole network, which stopped new fraud but did not reverse transactions already processed. Many owners shut down all their equipment as a precaution.
Caixa’s response
- The bank said its main systems were restored and that neither lottery operators nor customers would bear any losses.
- As a containment step, it capped two services, bill payments from other banks and deposits, at R$2,000 per operation across the entire network. Normal limits were expected to return on 27 July.
- Caixa has not said whether customer or operator data was accessed, nor how the attackers were able to issue transactions.
Impact
Lotéricas are a key channel for banking services in Brazil, especially for people without full bank access, so even a short disruption affects a large population. The pattern, with many outlets hit at once, points to a weakness in a central system or shared credentials rather than in individual terminals.
Recommendations
- Financial institutions running agent or correspondent banking networks should enforce per-terminal velocity limits and anomaly detection on high-value bill payments.
- Protect the central back-end and operator accounts with strong authentication and segregation, so one compromise cannot fan out across the network.
- Outlet operators should reconcile transactions daily and report unrecognised activity immediately through official channels.