Grupo Águas de Portugal (AdP), the state-owned holding that runs much of Portugal’s water supply and wastewater infrastructure, has disclosed a cyberattack it describes as being of high complexity. The incident took place on the Friday before 4 August 2026, which points to 31 July. Portuguese outlets ECO, TSF and Sol reported it after initial coverage by public broadcaster RTP.
What happened
The group said the attack affected part of the information systems of its companies, with the effect varying across its 13 mainland operating companies. It caused temporary disruption to administrative processes and to contact channels for customers and partners. AdP activated its incident response procedures immediately, and IT systems were being restored gradually.
The company stressed that water supply and sanitation services kept operating normally in all group companies. On 7 August, Environment and Energy Minister Maria da Graça Carvalho confirmed that the attack was confined to administrative systems and had not reached any public water supply system.
Data and authorities
- AdP said that, so far, there was no evidence of unauthorised access to personal data and no sign of data disclosure or exfiltration. The situation remains under monitoring.
- The Polícia Judiciária and the National Cybersecurity Centre (CNCS) are involved, and the data protection authority CNPD was notified as required by law.
- No group had publicly claimed the attack at the time of reporting, and the company did not describe the type of malware or intrusion.
Impact
Water utilities are a recurring target for both criminal and state-aligned actors across Europe. Even when operational technology is untouched, an attack on corporate IT can delay billing, customer service and maintenance coordination. Under NIS2, operators of this kind face strict reporting and resilience obligations.
Recommendations
- Maintain strict segmentation between corporate IT and the OT networks controlling treatment and distribution, with monitored, one-way or brokered data flows.
- Keep offline, tested backups of administrative systems and rehearse rebuilding customer-facing channels.
- Review remote-access paths, VPN accounts and third-party connections into utility networks, and enforce MFA everywhere.
- Prepare joint communication plans with regulators so the public can be reassured quickly about service continuity.